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JURISPRUDENCE: DUE PROCESS CONCERNS FOR THE
UNDERREPRESENTED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM
2
1
BY REBECCA FIALK AND TAMARA MITCHEL

INTRODUCTION

A variety of innovative court programs have been designed
to improve the traditional criminal justice response to domestic
violence. Specialized domestic violence courts have been created
to single out domestic violence cases for special treatment and
address the multiple legal, mental health, and social aspects of
family violence by providing a more comprehensive and integrated
approach that often combines criminal and civil cases.4 These
specialized courts are commonly referred to as integrated domestic
violence courts ("IDVC"). The ultimate goal of these specialized
courts is to control the abuser and to increase victim safety and
support services. Integrated domestic violence court programs
have developed in Quincy, Massachusetts, Westchester County,
New York,5 Dade County, Florida, and the District of Columbia
1

.Cornell University B.S.N; J.D. Pace University of Law; the authors give thanks
to Julia Bonner for her assistance with the project.
2 A.B. Harvard College; J.D. Harvard Law
School
3Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations,
2 J.
CTR. FAMS., CHILD & CTS., 23 (2000).
4See Robyn Mazur & Liberty Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic
Violence Court
Work: Lessons from New York, 42(2) A.B.A. JUDGES J. 10 (2003):
"Many domestic violence advocates are hesitant to embrace
the idea that domestic violence courts are 'problem-solving
courts.' There are substantial differences between domestic
violence courts and other problem-solving courts. Many of
these differences stem from how success is measured and to
whom services are offered. Drug courts can easily look to see
whether defendants are successfully completing their courtmandated drug-treatment programs. But domestic violence
courts are not targeted at 'rehabilitating' defendants. Indeed,
services are offered primarily to help victims achieve
independence. The primary 'service' offered to defendants is
batterers programs."
"In New York, under the leadership of Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, the state
court system has developed or is planning sixteen domestic violence courts,
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these innovative court responses to domestic
and exemplify
6
violence.
To accommodate the comprehensive judicial mandates the
integrated court's jurisdiction was expanded to include all cases in
the civil and criminal spheres relating to the victim, the abuser and
their families. 7 The majority of integrated courts allow one judge
to hear all the legal issues: criminal, family court and matrimonial
that may arise when domestic violence occurs. 8 In practice this
means that most integrated courts not only hear the criminal case
but also handle petitions for custody, visitation, paternity and
family offenses. The goal of these changes is not only to
consolidate the civil and criminal court cases so that proceedings
are procedurally more efficient and responsive to victims' needs
but also to enable the judge to craft practical orders that can truly
increase victim safety and encourage all victims to access the court
in times of need. 9
The newly created IDVCs eschew the traditional
adversarial models of jurisprudence in favor of a more clinical,
"problem-solving" approach to jurisprudence.10 A wide range of
social services for victims are integrated into the integrated courts,
and comprehensive information from social science professionals

including six recently-launched 'integrated domestic violence courts,' [IDVC]
in which the presiding judges handle all issues-both criminal and civil-affecting
a single family." Id.at 6. The IDVC developed as part of Chief Judge Kaye's
initiative to make the judiciary more responsive to victims of domestic violence
who confront complex legal issues and seek protection from the judicial system.
See also Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving
Courts into the Mainstream: A Report Cardfrom the CCJ-COSCA ProblemSolving Committee, 39 CT. REv. 4, 6 (2002).
6 Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1297
(2000); see also Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic
Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28 (2000).
7 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM, 3,29-30.

' See id.
9
Id. at 33.
10Tsai, supranote 5, at 1296-97.
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is provided to the judge, whose decisions can then take into
account the larger picture of the victims' situation and needs."
The extra-legal support and the judicial problem-solving
approach inherent in the IDVC is frequently referred to as
"therapeutic jurisprudence."' 12 Therapeutic jurisprudence brings a
practical, healing vision into the justice system, to address the
13
totality of what a domestic violence victim needs to be safe.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a concept that originated in the field
of mental health, and some proponents view both the perpetrator
and the victim as engaging in dysfunctional behavior.
It is the
author's belief that the mental health model of therapeutic
jurisprudence is not appropriate or even effective in domestic
violence cases. Rather the therapeutic jurisprudence guiding the
IDVC must focus on the abuser's dysfunction and offender's
accountability with the ultimate goal of increasing victim safety
and empowerment rather than "rehabilitation of the victim." While
the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence is embraced by many as a
means of providing support services to victims of domestic
violence in the integrated courts, in practice, it may give rise to
coercive forces that disempower the victim of domestic violence
and pose significant constitutional procedural due process issues.
Any new judicial posture that addresses and impacts the
critical issues of victim safety and family interests must be
11Id.
12 Therapeutic jurisprudence is a concept originating in the field of mental
health that has been embraced by IDVC reformers who are committed to using
the IDVC for "problem-solving" by reaching out to new disciplines for "extralegal" insights and methods to reduce domestic violence. Bruce J.Winick,
Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 U. Mo. KAN.
L. REv. 33, 33-34 (2000).
1Id.at 39-41.
14 See generall'y David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
From Idea to Application, 20 NEw ENG. J.ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243,
252 (1994).
15 Winick, supra note 11, at 78 ("Victims may develop various dysfunctional
thoughts and cognitive distortions... These cognitive distortions may prevent
her from taking steps to change her situation or distort her judgment in ways that
make her ignore signs of danger or fail to take appropriate action to protect
herself."); Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 31 ("One of the most important
roles of a domestic violence court is to confront the perpetrator's cognitive
distortions.").
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painstakingly examined for criterions of success as well as for
unintended outcomes. As the framers acknowledge, integrated
courts are works in progress, and as they evolve all participants
will play a role in shaping their future.
It is undeniable that the role of every attorney and client
and many witnesses in this court will be impacted by the new
powers and mandates of the IDVC. The driving force behind the
IDVC is to improve and expand extra-legal support for victims.
However, the therapeutic jurisprudence dispensing these support
services should be guided by the victims' expressed needs for
support rather than dictating a therapeutic plan to be followed.
Victims should play an active role in the process and not be
silenced from voicing their concerns and having their day in court.
Threats to the victim's constitutional procedural due process rights
increase exponentially when involved in an IDVC proceeding, due
to unconscious exposure to coercive forces of the government that
are inherent in the dispensation of "therapeutic jurisprudence."
Consequently, it is critical to examine the legal system's treatment
of victims involved in IDVC proceedings. This article will
examine the legal and extra-legal forces that victims of domestic
violence encounter in integrated courts and argue that they must be
guaranteed the right to counsel from the outset of any IDVC
proceeding to ensure their constitutional procedural due process
rights are adequately protected.
Domestic violence is commonly defined in terms of power
and control. Given the dynamics of domestic violence and the
power and control imbalance inherent in the victim's relationship
with her abuser it is likely that the victim will be subjected to the
abuser's manipulation and coercive influences during court
proceedings. Confronting the abuser face to face in court presents
an enormous obstacle in and of itself for many victims of domestic
violence and decreases the likelihood that the victim will stay in
the system long enough to pursue relief. 16 The assistance of
counsel minimizes these risks.
16

A

domestic

violence

victim,

despite

educational

background

or

resourcefulness often experiences utter powerlessness in the presence of the
batterer - an attorney equalizes this imbalance of power. In pilot studies with
Project DETER, the PWJC found that prior to a program providing 24/7 legal
services and vertical representation to victims of domestic violence seeking
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The abuser is not the only coercive force that the victim
might encounter in the IDVC. There is also an inherent conflict
between the victim and various representatives of the State who are
present in the IDVC ostensibly to provide extra support and
counsel to the victim. 18 Prosecutors litigating the criminal case
perform investigative, bureaucratic, administrative and political
functions. Prosecutors do not have an identity of interest with the
victim, do not advocate on behalf of the victim, and in fact, may
decide to prosecute the criminal case without the cooperation of
the victim. Prosecutors represent the State in the prosecution of
the criminal case and are often unavailable to the victim. More
importantly, prosecutors have no responsibility of confidentiality
to the victim that exists in a lawyer-client relationship. 19 Thus any
communications that the victim has with the prosecutor or the
prosecutor's representatives are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege.

relief in Family Court only 20% of those who sought temporary orders of
protection stayed in the system long enough to convert their temporary orders
into permanent orders as opposed to 95% after the implementation of the
program. Anecdotal reports of victims indicated that many had sought multiple
ex parte temporary orders that ultimately were dismissed or withdrawn due to
the victims' reluctance to navigate the court proceedings at least initially, pro se.
Statistics on file with the Pace Women's Justice Center, from a Grants To
Encourage Arrests, done in partnership with the White Plains Police
Department.
17 id
18 The "applicants" or "claimants" of a myriad of governmental
social welfare
programs (i.e., Department of Social Services, the Human Resources
Administration, and the Social Security Administration,) rarely access these
services or benefits without advice and/or advocacy from someone who is not
trying to "help," but rather to represent them. It is easy to understand why
"applicants" seeking redress/assistance from these agencies rarely proceed pro
se since the "helpers" or "therapists" the applicant encounters once entering the
system may exercise a vast amount of discretion that at times may seem lawless
and irrational and any appellate process equally defies pro se negotiations. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-269 (1970) (finding welfare recipients
who were denied benefits had right to counsel, albeit not appointed counsel,
because "helping" caseworkers' presentations of recipients' cases were not
sufficient to protect due process rights of having their position presented and
heard).
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 1.6, 4.1 (2002).
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The victim's confidentiality is also jeopardized when she
communicates with the support staff and various other advocates
and counselors who are present and make recommendations and
reports to the IDVC. If a victim who is reluctant to leave the
perpetrator speaks openly to an advocate or court representative,
who may also be a mandated reporter, regarding the on-going and
past abuse that has occurred in the presence of children she might
find herself vulnerable to a court-ordered investigation by child
abuse services or even to a neglect proceeding being filed against
her.2
IDVC proceedings also raise significant due process
concerns because of the impact of a predominantly criminal court
approach upon the victim's civil case. 2 ' In a "one family/one
judge" court, the same judge presides over the abuser's criminal
case as well as later civil actions for custody and/or divorce. The
IDVC judge may learn otherwise confidential information about
the victim in the context of the criminal case or from service
providers assigned to the criminal case investigation and who
report to a resource coordinator. The judge may consider it
relevant to seek important information regarding the victim's
psycho-social capacities when rendering a sentence in the criminal
case. These "insights" may negatively impact the victim in her
civil case.22 The judge hearing the civil cases of victims who have
refused to cooperate in their abuser's criminal prosecution may
feel legally and morally obligated to apply this finding against
the
23
recalcitrant victim in later divorce and custody decisions.
Integrated domestic violence courts are charting new
pathways in administering justice. Consequently, it is critical to
examine the system's treatment of victims involved in these
See Epstein, supra note 6, at 34
The necessity for clear separation of the criminal and civil Family Court
issues has been considered and implemented in the Westchester County IDVC.
"The separation is intended in part, to assure that the resolution of issues is not
mixed; so that there is no effort for quidpro quo." Protocol: IDVC - NINTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT (on file in offices of Pace Women's Justice Center).
22 In order to control for this overlap and possible prejudice
some IDVCs have
purposefully separated the civil and criminal cases and have calendared them for
different days of the week. Other IDVCs address this by resolving the criminal
cases prior to the civil cases. See Id.
23
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecution, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1898 (June, 1996).
20

21
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specialized courts and to include in this examination victims'
perspectives of what is important in charting these new pathways
to justice. This article will examine:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

core elements of the IDVC and coercive
forces inherent in the
dispensation of therapeutic
jurisprudence that impact unrepresented victims of
domestic violence in this context;
constitutional procedural due process bases
supporting IDVC victims' right to counsel;
statutory
and
precedential
authority
supporting IDVC victims' right to counsel;
the implications of a criminal template for
the IDVC, the IDVC victim's right to counsel and
when this right should attach; and,
propose certain ethical directives and
implications for best practice for attorneys
representing victims in the IDVC.

This article argues in support of victims' right to
independent legal representation to protect and safeguard their due
process rights as they seek relief in integrated domestic violence
courts. In essence, the authors hope to articulate a framework for
examining and evaluating the work of the IDVC to ensure, that the
improvements in terms of extra-legal support for victims do not
come at the expense of disempowering the victim and jeopardizing
the victim's constitutional legal rights to have her voice be heard
and to preserve her personal autonomy and liberty interests.

I.

CORE ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATED COURTS AND COERCIVE

FORCES INHERENT IN THE DISPENSATION
JURISPRUDENCE IN THIS CONTEXT

OF THERAPEUTIC

Celini24 is a woman from Equador who was referred by her
local police department to civil court for an order of protection.
She is the mother of a six-week-old baby boy whom she holds in
her arms. When the court Intake Advocate asks her to complete
This example is derived from an actual case handled by the Pace Women's
Justice Center (PWJC). However, all names have been changed and fact
patterns altered to protect confidentiality.
24
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the necessary court forms to begin her applicationfor a civil
protection order it becomes clear that she is illiteratein her native
Spanish. However, there is determination in her voice as she
describes why she has sought the services of civil court. She
recounts the events of the prior night that prompted her neighbor
to call the police and ended with her husband's arrest. "My
husband was drunk, " she says. "He swore at me and pushed me
onto the bed while I was carryingthe baby. The baby was lying on
the bed and my husband began to slap andpunch me on my arms
and chest. The baby startedto cry and when I reachedfor the baby
he slappedme in the face. His ring hit my mouth and my tooth was
chipped and my lip started to bleed and was sore and swollen. My
breasts and chest were tender and sore and it hurt when I took a
deep breath. "
The police arrived and arrested Celini's husband Celini
refused to press criminal charges but was interested in obtaining
an order of protection from civil court and was receptive to
learning about various counseling and support services available.
When the officers returned to the precinct they met with their
Domestic Violence supervisor and decided to file criminalcharges
against Celini's husband
The next morning Celini came to civil court and obtained a
temporary order of protection and temporary custody of the baby.
After speaking to the civil courtjudge at the ex parte proceeding,
Celini 's sense of burgeoningempowerment was palpable. Nothing
like this exists in her native country, she said in wonder, or if it
does, it is only for the very rich. In fact, after coming to the United
States her husband had always told her if the police ever were
called they would deport her and give him the baby since he had a
workpermit and she did not have any papers.
One week later Celini is sitting in the IDVC. The police
hadfiled criminal charges against her husband and the civil and
criminal cases have now been consolidated. Sullenly, almost
angrily, she tells the Intake Advocate she needs to withdraw all of
her temporary orders right away. She ran out offood and money,
she says, and couldn't ask her husband for any because the
criminal court protection order forbade him to contact or
communicate with her. On top of this, her sister-in-law and her
husband'sfamily is refusing to care for the baby while she is at
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work and are blaming her for her husband's arrest. The written
materials she had receivedfor support services, emergency shelter
and other help were useless to her and without childcare she is
afraidshe will lose herjob. Celinifelt totally isolatedand trapped
in criminal court proceedings that she had not requested and
couldn't begin to understandand it was evident she trusted no one.
She blamed the system for cutting off all ties to her only lifeline,
her husbandand his family. Furtherdown the hall, a man sat with
his family and attorney. The man kept looking at Celini with
pleading eyes. Celini was approachedby the district attorney, an
advocate and the court resource coordinator. She met each with
increasing hostility. Celini spoke in a voice loud enough for her
husband to hear and said, "Just leave me alone, I didn't want him
arrested. I love my husband He is a good father. Nobody is
listening to me. I want to drop all of these protection orders."
The court system in the above example is on the verge of
failing to protect Celini. Worse, it may teach her that the legal
system can make things more difficult for her and that it is the
wrong place to go when she needs help. Can any court system
truly protect Celini? What are realistic goals for any court system
as court reformers strive to improve the judicial response to
domestic violence to increase victim safety? Celini exemplifies
the problem this article hopes to address. Celini had been
empowered in civil court proceeding because she was in control of
her litigation and could seek an order of protection with provisions
crafted to suit her needs. Now, she finds herself in an environment
where no one is listening to her expressed desires and she feels
frustrated, out of control and disempowered.
Why is the integrated court failing Celini? The intended
IDVC role is to "craft a meaningful intervention that may change
future behavior." 25
As such the therapeutic jurisprudence
dispenses in the IDVC is an interdisciplinary approach that imports
psycho-sociological methods of inquiry as well as actual support
services into the work of the court. 6 A new court staff member,
the Resource Coordinator, "gathers information from all outside
25 Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, JudicialResponses to Domestic Violence:

The Casefor a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1999/2000).
16 Tsai, supra note 5, at 1295-96.
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agencies involved in a case . . . This ensures that the court has the
best information available when making decisions that can turn out
to be a matter of life or death." 2 Enhanced "information
technology . . . facilitates the transfer of critical information
between the court and a variety of other agencies that may be
involved in a domestic violence case." 28 IDVC framers believe
that a court thus fully informed of the many causes and effects of
the domestic violence in the parties' lives - a judge informed of the
"totality of [her]case in all its dimensions"2 9 -- will be able to
fashion and implement comprehensive and hence, more effective
remedies.
Presumably, these remedies may include orders
incorporating social and/or psychological prescriptions, consistent
with the judge's expanded jurisdiction and his or her behaviorchanging mandate.
After entering the court system, the victim is linked with
comprehensive services, including counseling services for the
victim and her children, housing assistance, employment training
and immigration status assistance, that will encourage her
participation in the legal process to help her escape the
perpetrator's abuse.3 ° One service provided almost universally is
"victim advocacy," i.e., consultation with specially trained
personnel who establish a relationship with the victim and assist
her in myriad ways, including explaining the legal process, linking
her to necessary services, helping with safety planning and
providing ongoing moral and emotional support.3 ' In many courts,
a victim advocate is present at all times in the courtroom as a court
employee, and reaches out to all victims after their initial court
appearance to help the victim with her legal and extra-legal
needs. 32 But what happens when the victim's desires conflict with
Kaye & Knipps, supra note 24, at 8.
Tsai, supra note 5, at 1301-02.
29 Karan, Keilitz, & Denaro, p. 83
30 Tsai, supra note 5, at 1298.
31 Id. at 1297-1308; Jennifer R. Hagan, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the
War? The Fight Against Domestic Violence After the Death of Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 919, 981-82 (2001).
32 Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Famham, Social Justice Collaboratives:
Multidisciplinary Practice for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227, 243 (2000).
Some victims may erroneously believe that communications with an advocate
are confidential. Margaret F. Brown, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure
27

28
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the stated goals and objectives of the advocacy support services.
For example, what will happen if a victim insists on a limited order
of protection that does not order the abuser to vacate the residence
when the advocate favors a vacate? Will the court ignore the
victim's voice and substitute their judgment for hers or will the
court fashion a remedy in conjunction with the victim that will
send a message to the to abuser so as to hold him accountable for
his actions as well as empower the victim by giving her control of
her case?
In addition to an inter-disciplinary problem solving
approach the IDVC also provides a more prominent judicial focus
on victim welfare. 33 Although offender accountability remains an
important component of the court's mandate, 34 this new victim
focus serves the "problem-solving" goal of eliminating domestic
violence by increasing victim safety. Under this model the judge's
jurisdiction in the IDVC is expanded to encompass a holistic
approach with a focus on victim safety. In many of the new
IDVCs, the judge presides over all legal actions involving the
to Liabilityfor Engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 34 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 279, 290 (2001). Since the IDVC advocate is acting as an arm of
the court and is not operating under the supervision of the victim's counsel,
there is no privilege that attaches to communications between advocates and
domestic violence victims. "Mandatory reporting of child abuse is an important
concern for domestic violence collaboratives because of the duty to report on the
part of some of the advocates." Trubek & Farnham, supra at 228. Rachel
Callahan suggests that the advocate-client relationship bears a strong
resemblance to the attorney-client relationship in that both the attorney and
advocate must know all the details of a victim's story in order to advocate
Callahan maintains that, since attorneys are exempted from
effectively.
mandatory reporting because of the need for full disclosure from the client,
advocates should be extended this privilege as well. Rachel Callahan, My Lips
are Sealed: The Nened for a Testimonial Privilege and Confidentiality for
Victim-Advocates, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 226, 245 (1996).
33Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 31.
34Lincoln (Neb.) Family Violence Council advocates documented a four-year

trend of declining number of domestic assaults despite increasing population
was reversed when courts moved from reliance on fines rather than jail or
probationary sentences for abusers. The council concluded that "while it doesn't
advocate sending all offenders to jail, statistics clearly show the heavy use of
Andrew Klein, Statistics, Nebraska
fines is ineffective and dangerous.
Advocates Link Decline in Sentencing Abusers to Increase in Reabuse,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION 8 May 2003 (Can't find this sorce)
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parties, including divorce, custody, child abuse and
35 neglect, civil
orders of protection, support and criminal matters.
By expanding judicial jurisdiction [intervention] and
integrating social services, IDVC reformers hope to give the victim
what she needs to be safe. 36 However, what the victim needs to be
safe however, may be defined differently by the IDVC and the
victim.
Empowering the victim by sending the message that
domestic violence is a serious crime and that community services
can be mobilized to respond to her safety needs may be just as
important as sending a message to the abuser that domestic
violence will not be tolerated and that he will be held accountable.
Consequently, providing a mouthpiece for the victim to express her
needs will be a critical element to empower and validate victims in
any IDVC that is truly victim focused. What remains to be seen is
who will determine what the victim needs to be safe. Will the
IDVC seek victim input into defining "safety" needs for her
particular situation? Will the IDVC problem-solving team accept
the victim's self-declared needs if they conflict with the remedies
recommended to the IDVC by the cadre of professionals providing
input and evaluation of a particular case? Will the IDVC victim
feel free to articulate her desires in the presence of her abuser?
35 Winick, supra note 11 at 39-40.

The impact of various police and community responses to domestic violence
victims' safety has often been evaluated by recidivism, mandatory arrest and
conviction rates. Joan Zorza has pointed out in her in- depth analysis of the
Minneapolis Police Experiment and replication studies that experiments
studying mandatory arrest of batterers showed very low rates of prosecution and
conviction which very likely prevented arrest from reaching the maximum
potential for deterrence. For example, in Milwaukee only 5% of the offenders
were charged with a crime and only 1% were convicted. Zorza opines that had
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of the offender occurred, the deterrence
effect of arrest may have been more significant. Joan Zorza, Must We Stop
Arresting Batterers?:Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police Domestic
Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929, 930, 985 (1994). However, Lisa
Lerman suggests that even prosecution and conviction may not be enough to
deter post-conviction recidivism. She believes that in order to decrease
recidivism rates, law enforcement must coordinate with social services and
mental health systems to monitor and treat abusers and maintain communication
with the courts. Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualizationof Domestic Violence,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 220-221 (1992).
36

2004-2005

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

Mandatory reporting laws also present a significant threat
to victims in integrated courts. The majority of professionals that a
victim is likely to encounter in integrated courts are mandated
reporters. An indigent victim proceeding pro se may unknowingly
divulge compromising information or make admissions on the
record that may later prove prejudicial or serve as a basis for a
neglect charge. Had this same victim been afforded counsel this
situation might have been avoided. An attorney representing a
client is notably exempted from the list of mandated reporters.
This exemption from reporting is an acknowledgment of the great
social value inherent in the relationship between an attorney and
client, in which the attorney37 holds an inviolable duty not to
disclose a client's confidences.
Will the unprecedented focus on extra-legal problemsolving in integrated courts add new dimensions to the victim's
attorney's ethical responsibilities? Or will her attorney's duties be
vitiated by a panoply of advocates, counselors, coordinators and
the all-knowing judge, all devoted to promoting the victim's best
interests? Or will it be that, as this article contends, the right to
counsel will be even more critical than in the past and will be
crucial at the victim's first appearance in the IDVC in order to
protect her procedural due process right to let her voice be heard?
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROCEDURAL

DUE PROCESS

BASES

SUPPORTING VICTIMS' RIGHT To COUNSEL IN INTEGRATED
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS

There are two Due Process clauses in the United States

Constitution. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits the
power of the national government and the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the power of state governments. Both clauses guarantee that
no person shall be deprived by the government "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 38 Due Process guarantees a
fair and reasonable law (i.e, substantive due process) as well as a
fair proceedings in the application and enforcement of the law
with notice and opportunity to be heard (i.e. procedural due
process).
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R.
38 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.

1.6 (2001).
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A substantive due process claim asserts a law as written is
not fair because it unduly burdens or interferes with a liberty or
property interest, while a procedural due process claim asserts an
individual is being deprived of a liberty or property interest
without a fair hearing (i.e., lack or notice or opportunity to be
heard).
Due process has never been precisely defined and there is
no bright line rule for its application. 39 Moreover, "[t]he very
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
' '4
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.
"Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain
enterprise where a court must determine what "fundamental
fairness" consists of in a particular situation by first considering
any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests
that are at stake.'
Failure to provide victims of domestic violence with
counsel in the IDVC may deprive them of their procedural due
process rights since, without representation, victims may be forced
to litigate or proceed in judicial proceedings in which they
encounter coercive forces and bargain away their right to personal
autonomy and safety. Victims proceeding without counsel in the
IDVC may not have an adequate and meaningful opportunity to be
heard on matters of utmost importance to their personal autonomy
or liberty interests. 42 The right to be present at a court proceeding
is not synonymous with the right to meaningful access and the
right to be heard. How can it be "fundamentally fair" to give
victims access and the right to be present in the IDVC if they are
not guaranteed that their voices will be heard?
There is no constitutional right to counsel in civil litigation
unless it is clearly established that a fundamental right or liberty
39 Lassister v. Dep't Soc. Serv. 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
40

Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961).

41Lassister, 452 U.S. at 24-25; see also Cafeteria & Rest. Workers 452 U.S. at

895 ("[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action.").
42 "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
268-69.
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interest is at issue. 43 Counsel has been constitutionally required
even where a person's own physical liberty is not implicated but
where "liberty interests" are at issue. These "liberty interests"
have included rights to bodily integrity 44 as well as rights
4
concerning parenthood and the family. '

All IDVC proceedings concern issues and choices
surrounding marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children.
To protect these fundamental interests, victims must be guaranteed
the assistance of counsel in order to neutralize coercive forces in
the course of the court proceedings that may deprive them of these
interests.
Procedural Due Process Analysis
Procedural due process means that there must be procedural
protections in place to protect individuals engaged in the process of
preserving fundamental and/or important interests.
A procedural due process analysis involves determining the
following:
1)
2)

3)

if a "fundamental" or protected
interest in life, liberty, or property is
threatened by governmental action
if the protected right is impaired
to such a degree as to trigger due process
(i.e. impairment must rise above de
minimus threshold level)
what procedure is fair in the
particular case (i.e., what type of notice
and/or opportunity to be heard that must
be afforded in the particular case).

4' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (2003); Christy v. Robinson, 216 F.Supp.2d 398 (2002).

44 Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (holding
that the right to make one's own health care decisions has been recognized as a
substantial right deserving governmental protection);
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492 (1986).
41 In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 357 (1972).
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Personal Liberties: Penumbras and Emanations
The first step in any procedural due process inquiry is
determining whether the government interferes with a fundamental
or protected liberty interest. 46 Protected liberty interests that trigger
due process rights that are classified as "fundamental" and falling
within the protection of the Due Process clause may be specifically
mentioned or enumerated in the Bill of Rights such as freedom of
speech and right of privacy, or may be found to lie "within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. 4 7
Other protected liberty interests triggering
procedural due process protection are defined by statute,
regulation, case precedent and official custom and practice.
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of
children are among rights that the Supreme Court has ranked of
"basic importance in our society...rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect ' 48 Justice Douglas in Griswold
recognized the right of marital privacy and linked this right to a
Since the 1960's the Supreme Court has found that certain
unenumerated rights are "fundamental" and merit constitutional
protection because they are implicit in the enumerated guarantees
of personal liberty. Chief Justice Berger wrote, "[n]otwithstanding the
46

appropriate caution against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly
defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are
implicit in enumerated guarantees." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980). The Court recognized that the nature of liberty
interests is not static and may evolve over time to conform to societal needs and
directives. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 ("To believe that this
judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing 'due process of law'
at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important
aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and
not for judges"). It should also be noted that states may afford their citizens
more protection under their state constitutions and/or statutes than is afforded
under the U.S. Constitution and/or federal statutes. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 488 (1980).
47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
48 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1966); The Second Circuit has held it
to be
"beyond peradventure" that the "existence of a private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter has its source not in state law, but in intrinsic
human rights"; Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (1977).
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"zone of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees ' ' 9
that have Penumbras emanating from those guarantees in the Bill
of Rights. Other justices in Griswold rejected this approach and
found the right of marital privacy "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." 5' And as such fell within the "liberty" of the 14th
Amendment Due Process Clause. 52 Other justices agreed that the
right of marital privacy is an aspect of due process "liberty" but
based their conclusion on the Ninth Amendment 53 that states "the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"
(emphasis added).5 4
While the seven members of the Griswold majority offered
different bases for finding a fundamental right of marital privacy
they uniformly agreed that certain liberty interests fell within the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause even though they are
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Since Griswold,
the Supreme Court has recognized other non-enumerated personal
liberty interests that fall within the Due Process Clause. In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)
Chief Justice Burger stated that "the Court has acknowledged that
certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guaranties."
What initially began as a right of privacy has subsequently
evolved into a right of personal autonomy. In Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S.589, 599-600 (1977) the Court further defined the right of
personal autonomy as "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." Personal decisions the Court
has found to be protected by the right to personal autonomy

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
'o Griswold,381 U.S. at 484-86.
49

5' Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500.

2Id. at 499.
Following this analysis Justice Goldberg in Griswold concluded that the
unenumerated "right of privacy in marital relations is . . . a personal right
'retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment" and
th
consequently is a "fundamental" personal liberty protected by the 14
Amendment
Due Process Clause. Id. at 486. Anne, this is where I stopped.
54
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, 486-86,492-93.
53
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include decisions regarding marriage, 55 family integrity 56, and
intimate associations .
Additionally, courts have recognized a fundamental right to
bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
These cases have
generally involved women contemplating certain medical
procedures 8 but a similar argument can be made for the domestic
violence victim who is attempting to retain her physical and
emotional freedom i.e., personal autonomy.
In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey the Court expanded the notion of personal
liberty to encompass the liberty interest of personal autonomy.
The Casey Court held that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."5 9 The Court went on
to state that "[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is 60a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter,"
and "[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy 61
are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Casey Court recognized a zone of privacy centered
about private and personal decisions. However, a court has never
recognized the "right" of a domestic violence victim to be free
from her abuser as a fundamental right or liberty interest.
Yet domestic violence victims seeking redress in integrated
courts must make numerous decisions central to their personal
autonomy and family integrity. Should they stay or should they
end the relationship? What is in their children's best interests?
55Zablocki v. Redhail, 433 U.S. at 386 (marriage established "the relationship
that is the foundation of the family in our society")
56 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidated ordinance
that interfered with family living arrangement by barring a grandmother, her
son, and 2 grandsons from living together in the same home).
57 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,618 (1984) ("certain kinds of
highly personal relationships [must be afforded] a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the state")
58 Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
'9Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 851.
60 Id. at 847.
61 Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 851.
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What is the safest course of action? Following the Casey logic it
can be argued that a domestic violence victim should have the
same fundamental right to control her own person and be free from
governmental interference when making personal decisions
62
regarding marriage, family integrity and intimate relationships.
Consequently, a victim of domestic violence has a right to counsel
because the domestic violence victim may be deprived of her
fundamental liberty interest and personal autonomy and, in many
cases, her life if she is not afforded representation in the IDVC to
guarantee her an opportunity to be heard.
The liberty interests in personal autonomy and intimate
personal decision-making discussed above that are guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause are negative liberties in the sense that
individuals are not absolutely guaranteed that the government will
make these rights available to them but only have a right to be free
from governmental interference if exercising these rights. Thus,
the Due Process Clause does NOT require the government to
assume an affirmative duty to protect or guarantee individuals the
means to exercise these liberties if they cannot do so on their own
UNLESS the government assumes or enters into a "special
relationship" with an individual by "restraining the individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf.63 Consequently, where the
government has placed the individual in a position where he is
"more vulnerable" and has less "freedom to act on his own behalf'
64
or she would have had without the government action,
he
than
the government may develop a "special relationship" with that
62

In Nicolson v. Williams, 203F.Supp. 2d 153 (2002) the court, quoting M.L.B.

v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) stated, "choices about marriage, family, life, and
the upbringing of children are among associational rights the court has ranked of
'basic importance in our society,' . . . rights sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation disregard, or
disrespect." Id.at 233. The Nicholson court then went on to state this liberty
interest in the private realm of family life is also protected by international law
instruments of which the United States is a signatory. Id.at 234. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 12 ("no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondance."); Internationl
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 17 ("No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his... family").
63 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 197200 (1989).
64Id. at 200-201.
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individual and therefore, an
affirmative duty to protect that
65
interests.
liberty
individual's
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) the court
found that a state mental hospital had a "special relationship" with
inmates involuntarily confined and consequently had an
affirmative duty to protect and care for the inmates and to preserve
their liberty interests in physical safety and bodily freedom.
In contrast, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 the Court distinguished
Youngberg and held that a state had no affirmative constitutional
duty to protect a child from being beaten by its father because there
was no "special relationship" between the child and the state since
the child was living at home and was not in the custody of the
state.
Whether a "special relationship" existed in Youngberg and
DeShaney turned on the control the government had over the
individual.
In Youngberg the inmates were found to have a "special
relationship" with the government because they were under the
control of the government since they were confined within a state
mental hospital and subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated within the state facility. In contrast, in DeShaney,
there was no "special relationship" between a child and the state
because the child was living at home and was not subject to control
and regulation by the state. In their analysis the DeShaney court
suggested that the result would have been different had the child
been in the custody and control of the state instead of in the
custody and control of the parents.
IDVC victims who are not guaranteed counsel are similar
to the inmates in Youngberg and have a "special relationship" with
65

It is generally accepted that before a municipality can be liable for tort

damages for failure to protect against the acts of a third party a "special
relationship" must exist between the municipality and the individual. While an
order of protection standing alone does not establish this "special relationship" a
duly issued order of protection constitutes an assumption by the municipality of
an affirmative duty of protection coupled with an awareness that inaction could
lead to harm and should additional contact between the munincipality and the
injured party lead to the party's justifiable reliance on the munincipality for
protection then liability for failure to protect might attach. Mastroianni v.
County of Suffolk, 668 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1977).
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the state since they are essentially subject to the arms of the court
as they navigate the court proceedings. They may become subject
to court mandates and be forced to participate in proceedings that
they did not initiate such as criminal cases, court ordered
investigations and the like.
The IDVC has been created by legislation and creates an
environment where multiple disciplines converge to create a plan
for victims of domestic violence. Victims who proceed without
counsel in the IDVC may find their liberty interests in personal
autonomy at odds with the therapeutic jurisprudence of integrated
courts. The fact that court intervention might be at odds with
victims' goals and objectives was recognized by the court in
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, when it stated that to
"satisfy due process the court must conduct sufficient investigation
to establish objectively reasonable case planning., 66 It is unlikely
that this objective case planning in which the victim is an active
participant can be achieved in the IDVC unless victims are
represented by counsel.
Due Process Rights in the Absence of "Fundamental" or
Enumerated Liberty Interests:
The indigent civil litigant has no constitutional right to
appointed counsel unless
fundamental rights or protected liberty interests are at issue.
Courts have been reluctant to create new "fundamental liberty
interests" requiring appointment of counsel.68 Yet courts have
recognized there are circumstances where individuals face such
grievous consequences should they be denied counsel that courts in
their discretion should assign counsel to preserve due process
66

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153,237 (2002).

67 Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-

Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19
HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397,408-09 (Summer 1984); Lisa E. Martin, Comment,
ProvidingEqualJusticefor the Domestic Violence Victim: Due Processand the
Victim's Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L.REv. 329,348 (1998-99).
68",[i]t is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate
a precise and
detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of
counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements," since
"[t]he facts and circumstances ... are susceptible of almost infinite variances...
"Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790.
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rights69 and ensure that judicial proceedings are "fundamentally
fair".

The requirement that counsel be appointed for an indigent
where no potential for deprivation of fundamental and or physical
liberty exists but where important "liberty interests" are at issue is
discussed in the Supreme Court's opinion in Lassiter v.
Departmentof Social Services.70 In Lassiter the court wrote:
...it is the defendant's interest and personal freedom and not
simply the special sixth and fourteenth amendments right to
counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed
counsel ...
71

The Lassiter court described the analysis required in cases
where "liberty interests" rather than physical freedom is at stake.
The Lassiter court spoke of balancing the three elements
articulated in Mathews2 "against each other, and then setting their
net weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right
to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful
may lose his personal freedom." 73 Thus in civil cases in which
direct personal freedom is not at stake, the court must look to and
balance the private interests at stake, the government's interests
and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous
decisions and then balance the net weight of these factors against
the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only
where the indigent, if unsuccessful, may lose their "liberty
interests."
While the Lassiter court held there was no
constitutional right to assigned counsel for parental termination
proceedings it found that in appropriate cases a balancing of the
Mathews factors and the parental interests in a individual case
could overcome the presumption against the right to appointed
69

Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993);

States have recognized the

vulnerability of litigants in various contexts and have passed legislation
providing assigned counsel to indigent litigants in proceedings where important,
albeit
not "fundamental" or even enumerated, liberty interests may be impacted.
7
'

Lassiter,452 U.S. at 18.

71Id. at

Q1980).

25; See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480

2Mathews, 42 U.S. at 319 (e.g., the private interests at stake, the government's
interests, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous
decision).
73Lassiter,452 U.S. at 27
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counsel. In dicta, the Lassiter court underscored the importance of
ensuring that any judicial process is "fundamentally fair" and
stated "[a] wise public policy, . . ., may require that higher
standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the
Constitution. 74
Applying this analysis to a victim involved in a custody
case in the IDVC it is clear that the victim has tremendous "liberty
interests" at stake, her family, her children and her home
environment are impacted by any judicial directive, the
government's interest are those of punishing the defendant if there
is a criminal case pending, as well as deterrence, rehabilitation and
victim safety.
In the event of a custody proceeding the
government's main interest is to preserve the family and/or act as
parens patriae if the children are at risk. Even if a visitation or
custody petition is not directly before the court it may become a
collateral matter in a family offense proceeding if the victim is
seeking an order of protection on behalf of her children. If the
victim is unrepresented and does not have a voice in the decisionmaking which is arrived at via a myriad of service provider reports
that may not account for the victim's perspective, the risk is high
that an erroneous decision will be made that may even impact the
safety of the victim. 75 Balancing the weight of these factors
against the presumption that there is a right to counsel only if the
victim, if unsuccessful, will lose her "liberty interests," it is clear
that a victim of domestic violence should have a right to counsel in
the IDVC. Without counsel the victim has no real voice in the
process and is vulnerable to settling the case according to the
consensus and recommendations of the service providers and as a
result may agree to terms that in fact jeopardize her safety or the
safety of her children.
74

Id. at 33.

75 See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE,

U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT
PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 19 (1990) cited in Margaret F. Brown, 34
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 279, n. 23 (2001) ("those victims who are not
represented by counsel are less likely to get protection orders - and, if an order
is issued, it is less likely to contain all appropriate provisions regarding
exclusion from the residence, temporary custody of children, child support, and
protective limitations on visitation rights").
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Due Process and Right to Assigned Counsel in Domestic Violence
Civil Litigation:
A civil litigant has a constitutional right to retain hired
counsel. 76 This right is rooted in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment notions of due process but does not require courts to
provide lawyers for litigants in civil matters.77 Historically the
78
right to counsel for civil actions was virtually non-existent.
However, as previously discussed, some courts have found that the
Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel in cases
when a fundamental liberty interest is in jeopardy,79 when an
individual's proceeding is quasi - criminal or involves the potential
for loss of physical liberty, or in instances when an extreme
imbalance of power between litigants exists.81
The United States District Court in Nicholson v. Williams 2
found that due process rights of victims of domestic violence were
violated when their children were removed from their custody by
76

U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. V; While never directly addressing the right to retain

hired counsel in civil litigation the Supreme Court has indicated in its criminal
decisions that the right to retain counsel in civil litigation is implicit under the
Fifth Amendment's concept of due process and the principle that notice and
hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable
judgment. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
77 R.B. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., et al., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
78 Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
QuasiCriminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 397, 406 (1984), cited in Lisa Martin, Providing Equal
Justicefor the Domestic Violence Victim: Due Process and the Victim's Right
to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REv. 329 (1998-1999).
79 "A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, as well as for his care and
control, involves too fundamental an interest and right to be relinquished to the
State without the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned counsel if the parent
lacks the means to retain a lawyer." In re B., 30 N.Y.2d at 356-57.
80 "We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may
result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is
curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel,
that counsel will be appointed to represent the child." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
41.
81Catz & Firak cited in Martin, supra note 76.
82 Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (2d Cir. 2002).
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ACS solely on the grounds that the mothers had been abused. The
court not only found that an important liberty interest existed but
also held that due process required that counsel be assigned. The
court stated that "domestic violence cases involve special problems
that make the lack of effective representation particularly
dangerous." The court emphasized that physical safety of victims
is often at risk, and decisions that mothers make in legal matters
83
may have life or death consequences for herself and her children.
The court stated, "[w]hen counsel is not assigned to represent
indigent petitioners in family offenses, victims of domestic
violence must make critical decisions on their own that may affect
their future physical safety." 84 Moreover, the court stressed that
the right to appointed counsel when necessary for due process is
the right to effective counsel.85 In Nicholson, the court found that
assigned counsel had not been effective because the appointment
came too late, counsel did not have the time or resources to
adequately
prepare to effectively represent the victims' liberty
86
interests.
The Nicholson court emphasized that "domestic violence
cases present complex issues of accountability and services that
few battered women will be able to resolve without an effective
advocate. These issues can arise in case conferences, where much
of the safety planning actually occurs, as well as in court." 87 In
addressing post dispositional conferences, the court stated, "the
presence of an attorney or other advocate . . . can mean the
difference between an inadequate and effective case plan, and
one
88
that engages the parent and adequately addresses her needs."
State Action Impeding Liberty Interest
If one accepts that a domestic violence victim has a liberty
interest in preserving personal autonomy that may be jeopardized
within the context of an integrated court proceeding then the next
step in a procedural due process analysis is to find a state action
83 Id. at

228.

84
1d. at
85

153.

1Id. at

239.
86 Id.at 255.
87
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. at 228.
88

Id.
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that impedes her exercise of this right to such a degree that it
triggers due process scrutiny. 89 Yet, the IDVC is a court that is
specifically designed to provide domestic violence victims easier
access to a multitude of support services. How could any state
action in this setting and undertaken for this purpose be perceived
to impede a victim's liberty interest? The procedural due process
argument is twofold: 1) that coercive forces inherent within the
problem-solving/therapeutic context create a power imbalance
between the victim and the "system" to such an extent that the
victim will not have an opportunity to be heard; and 2) that it is the
state's failure to act in this particular context that interferes with
the victim's fundamental right to exercise their personal autonomy.
The state's failure to act to provide counsel to IDVC victims
unduly burdens, impedes and possibly prevents their opportunity to
be heard. It seems contradictory to establish an IDVC and to
encourage victims to access the court system, but once granting
access, through passivity deny the victims meaningful presence
and participation in the court proceedings by not providing victims
the right to counsel. 90
Determining the Nature of the Hearing Required
The final step in the procedural due process analysis is to
determine what type of hearing, i.e., notice and opportunity to be
heard is fair in the particular case. Typically the three-part test
from Mathews v. Eldridge9l is applied in a procedural due process
analysis. When applying the Mathews test, the court must balance
three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action;
(2) the risk that the deprivation will occur erroneously based on the
Examples of "state action" interfering with a fundamental right include
preventing non-property owners from voting in elections for approving the
issuance of general obligations bonds, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970); preventing residents of a school district from voting in a school
district election unless they own taxable real property, Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); requiring voters to pay local poll taxes
required by state law before being permitted to vote in federal elections, Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
90 See discussion supra note 62 where government is deemed to have a special
relationship with an individual and therefore assumes an affirmative duty to act
to protect that individual's liberty interests.
91Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89
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procedures used and the value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government interest in
92
maintaining the current procedures (i.e. the cost-benefit analysis).
The private interests at stake for the victim of domestic
violence is the victim's physical liberty interest in escaping being
held hostage by her abuser, the victim's right to personal autonomy
and to make personal and family decisions, and the right to be free
from emotional and physical abuse. The risk that she might be
erroneously deprived of this interest is high in the IDVC given the
power and control dynamics inherent in the relationship of the
victim and abuser combined with the power imbalance the victim
faces when facing the cadre of IDVC experts and support staff
should their recommendations conflict with her wishes and she is
seen as a recalcitrant or uncooperative victim. The government
also has an interest in engendering faith in the system and having
judicial proceedings
for IDVC victims perceived as
"fundamentally fair" with the process viewed by victims as a
safety net responsive to their articulated safety needs. Both of
these interests - the victim's interest in personal autonomy and the
government's interest in not erroneously depriving an IDVC victim
of meaningful access to the court more than outweigh the
government's competing concern to prevent increased costs and
administrative burdens.
In the case of a domestic violence victim the state could
argue that the victim does not require the assistance of counsel in
the IDVC because it is a court that has been designed specifically
to respond to the victim's needs and that providing for assigned
counsel would only increase the tax burden and add more expenses
to this process.
The argument that assigning counsel to IDVC victims
poses too much of a tax burden must fail because silencing the
domestic violence victim only perpetuates the intergenerational
cycle of violence and ultimately results in tremendous costs to
society. Whatever short-term tax burden that would result from
providing counsel to IDVC victims would be more than offset in
later savings. It is extremely difficult to accurately ascertain the

92

Id. at 335.
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economic costs of domestic violence. 93 Incidents of violence often
remain hidden and the statistics that are available frequently
examine only costs to the individual, without considering effects
on the community. 94 It is clear, however, that physical abuse of
women has an overwhelmingly damaging impact on the
economy. 95 Estimates of total costs of violence against women in
the United States range from $3 billion to96 $10 billion in health
care, criminal justice, and other social costs.
Domestic violence results in exorbitant health care costs. A
recent study by the Center for Disease Control found that domestic
violence now costs an estimated $4.1 billion each year in health
care expenses alone, including medical and mental health care
services. 9 7 Other studies have figured that number to be as high as
$10 billion98 and a 1996 study found that women make 1.85
million emergency department visits annually as a result of
domestic violence. 9 Women are treated for injuries caused by
domestic violence incidents than by any other cause of injury.
Additionally, abused women have higher levels of health care use
than did women who do not have a history of abuse.' 0 ' Not
included in the above figures is the cost of mental health assistance
93 James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting
Physicians,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, n.6 (Winter 1996).
94 Kelsey S. Barnes, The Economics of Violence: Why Freedomfrom Domestic

Violence must be Treated as a Developmental Right in InternationalLaw, 6
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 97, 118 (1997/1998).
9' S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
96 S. REP. No. 10 1-138, at 41 (1993); see also NATIONAL
CENTER FOR INJURY
PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ATLANTA, GA: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTIONS, Costs of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the
United States 32 (Mar. 2003) available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pubres/ipvcost/IPVBook-Final-Feb 18.pdf (last visited on July 24, 2003).
97 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ATLANTA,
GA:
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTIONS, Costs of Intimate Partner
Violence Against Women in the United States 30 (Mar. 2003) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipvcost/IPVBook-Final-Feb 18.pdf
(last
visited on July 24, 2003).
98 Barnes, supra note 91 at 119.
99 Mary-Christine Sungaila, Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 9 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 369, 391 (Spring 2000).
1o Id.
101 Id.
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who
and therapy for the anywhere from 3.3 to 10 million children
102
homes.
their
within
violence
domestic
witness
annually
The workplace is affected by domestic violence at a price
tag of approximately $3-5 billion per year through absenteeism and
lost productivity. 10 3 One study found that of employed victims of
domestic violence, 60 percent were late to work, 50 percent missed
days of work, and 70 percent had difficulty performing their job
because of the abusive situation. 10 4 Domestic violence perpetrators
commit more than 13,000 acts of violence against women at their
workplace every year 0 5 and a study found that nearly 75 percent
were harassed by their abusive partners either on the phone or in
person while at work. 10 6 In a 1994 survey, almost 50 percent of
senior executives reported that domestic violence had a harmful
effect on their company's productivity. 107 Losing a worker, either
because her abuser forces her to leave work' 0 8 or because of death
due to domestic violence' 0 9 is a significant business cost.110 The
loss of a trained worker results in initial lost time, cost of replacing
the lost worker and training the new worker, and the continuous
loss of productivity until the new worker begins to function at the
same skill level as the lost employee.' 1
Domestic violence prevents women from achieving full
participation in the national economy' l2 and has an adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by deterring from traveling interstate and
engaging in employment in interstate business, decreasing the
102

Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence. Legal

Connections,
29 FAM. L. Q. 357, 370 (Summer 1995).
113Id. at 381, 385.
'04 Barnes, supra note 91, at 121-22.
105 Sungaila, supra note 96, at 387.
106 Barnes, supra note 91, at 122.
107
108

id.

Sungaila, supra note 96, at 384.

109 An estimated 1,252 women are killed by an intimate partner each year.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ATLANTA, GA:
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTIONS, Costs of Intimate Partner

Violence Against Women in the United States 19 (Mar. 2003) available at
(last
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv-cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb 18.pdf
visited on July 24, 2003).
110Barnes, supra note 91, at 122-23.

"' Id. at 123.
112 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
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demand for interstate products, increasing the medical and other
costs, and decreasing national productivity." 3 Victims suffer from
decreased productivity because they are harassed by their batterers
while at work, prevented from arriving at work on time, and must
often skip work entirely because of injuries1 14 or because they were
threatened by their abusers to the point that they were afraid to go
to work.1 15 The CDC report found that women in the U.S. may be
losing a combined 8 million days of paid work each year because
of domestic violence, resulting in an estimated loss of $727.8
million.116 The CDC also reported that the expected value of lost
earnings that domestic violence homicide victims would have
contributed to society had they lived to their full life expectancy is
$892.7 million."i7 At least 30 percent of domestic violence victims
report having lost a job because of domestic violence." 8 A 1997
study found that 46 percent
of participants' abusers forbade the
9
participants to hold jobs. 11
The limitations that domestic violence places on women's
economic opportunities results in an increased dependency on
public assistance, 120 thereby raising the economic costs to society.
Between 50 to 80 percent of women across the nation receiving
AFDC are past or current victims of domestic violence and as
many as 65 percent of welfare recipients reported that they had
21
been victims of physical domestic abuse at some point.'
Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with
ConservativeJudicialActivism, 45 V.L.L.R. 201, xxx (200).
114 Sungaila, supra note 96, at 381.
11 Id. at 384.
113

116 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ATLANTA,

GA:
Costs of Intimate Partner
Violence Against Women in the United States 19 (Mar. 2003) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv-cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb 18.pdf
(last
visited on July 24, 2003).
117 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ATLANTA, GA:
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTIONS,

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTIONS, Costs of Intimate Partner

Violence Against Women in the United States 19 (Mar. 2003) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipvcost/IPVBook-Final-Feb 18.pdf
(last
visited on July 24, 2003).
118 Sungaila, supra note 96 at 386.
19 Id. at 383.
120 Id. at 393.
121 Id. at 394.
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Domestic violence victims are more likely than non-victims to
receive welfare for five years or longer.' 22 In New York City
alone, an estimated 21 percent of homeless families and 25 percent
of single homeless women are without shelter due to domestic
violence; using 1991 shelter cost estimates of $90 per day for 23
a
family and $40 for singles, the annual total cost is $34 million.'
Furthermore, 40 percent of children in New York City's foster care
system come from domestically violent families, and in 1991 the
cost of keeping a child in the foster care system was $13,600 per
124
child annually, adding up to a total cost of 71.5 million.
Regardless of these or similar economic interests raised by the
State to argue why assigned counsel is not a cost-effective method
of guaranteeing procedural due process to victims of domestic
violence in integrated courts the tax burden argument must fail
because there is overwhelming evidence of the substantial costs to
society imposed by domestic violence.
III. STATUTORY AND PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR RIGHT
To COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION

In order to ensure "fundamental fairness" in civil litigation
Congress has granted district courts statutory authority to "request"
appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants. 125 28 USCA 1915(e)
Proceedings in forma pauperis, provides: (e)(1) The court may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel (italics for emphasis). This statute is understood to
guarantee indigents "meaningful access" to the courts as required
by the Constitution,1 26 but to date has never been interpreted as
guaranteeing every indigent civil litigant the right to appointed
122 Id. at 395.
123 Barnes, supra note 92 at 126.
124 id.

12528 U.S.C.A. §1915(e) (West 2003). States have also provided similar
guarantees. See NY CPLR 1102. A person who is granted poor person status is

potentially eligible for the assignment of free counsel. Whether counsel is
assigned is at the discretion of the court and indigency by itself does not entitle a
party to the appointment of free counsel. The constitutional right to counsel in
civil proceedings is restricted to situations in which physical liberty is at stake or
where "liberty interests" are at issue. McKinney's CPLR 1102 Practice
Commentaries (1997)
126

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977).
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counsel. Generally under 1915 the court has discretion whether or
not to appoint counsel. 2 7 However, the circuits are split as to how
the courts should exercise their discretion. In Hodge v. Police
Officers, the Second Circuit laid down a test for the district court to
apply when determining whether to assign counsel to an indigent
civil litigant. 12 8 The test adopted by the Hodge court was of 1the
29
same breath of the seventh's circuits ruling in Maclin v. Freake.
[T]he district judge should first determine whether the
indigent's position seems likely to be of substance. If the claim
meets this threshold requirement, the court should then consider
the indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether
conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination
will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent's
ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and
any special reason in th[e] case why appointment
of counsel would
13
be more likely to lead to a just determination. 0
In Hodge, the plaintiff brought a claim against two police
officers for beating him without cause in connection with his
apprehension (and later conviction) for robbery, assault, and
criminal possession of a weapon. The district court denied
Hodge's request for counsel stating that the issues to be presented
at trial were straightforward and the outcome of the case would
turn on the credibility of Hodge and the officers.13 The Second
Circuit vacated and remanded the case back to the district court,
finding that the trial judge failed to determine whether Hodge's
claim was of substance, and the fact that if the case was to run on
the credibility of the participants then there was 32a strong case for
the appointment of counsel in the civil litigation.'
More recently, the Third Circuit in Montgomery v.
Pinchak133 provided that the district courts have broad discretion in
appointing counsel for an indigent party but went on to lay out a
127

See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986); Montgomery
v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2002); Christy v. Robinson, 216 F. Supp. 2d
398 (2002).
129 Hodge, 802 F.2d
at 61.
129 Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d
885 (7th Cir. 1981).
130 Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61.
131 Id. at 62.
32
1
Id at62.
133 Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 492 (3d Cir. 2002).
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test for the district courts to apply in exercising their discretion to
appoint counsel: first, the party seeking counsel must meet a
minimum threshold that his or her cause has some merit in law and
fact and as such establishing a prima facie case. Then the court
will examine the six "post-threshold" factors established in Tabron
v. Grace134 to determine whether counsel is appropriate. These
factors are not exhaustive
and are meant only to serve as
35
guideposts and include:'
(1) plaintiff's ability to present his own case;
(2) difficulty of the particular legal issues;
(3) degree to which factual investigation will be
necessary and ability of plaintiff to pursue such
investigation;
(4)
plaintiffs capacity to retain counsel on his
own behalf;
(5) extent to which the case is likely to turn on
credibility determinations; and
(6) whether the case will require testimony from
expert witnessesl36
The Eighth Circuit applies a less stringent test. Under Hahn v.
McCley,137 only the minimum threshold test of the Second, Third
and Seventh Circuits that a prima facie case exists before the
court, upon an indigent's request, should order the appointment of
counsel.138 The Fifth,' 39 Sixth , Ninth, and Eleventh 4 ° Circuits
134 Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.
13 5 Id. at 155-157.
136 Id. cited in Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499.

1993).

137 Hahn v. McCley, 737 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1984)court held that counsel should
be assigned counsel where inmate's Eighth Amendment claim that was deprived
of prescribed medication was found to be too complex and therefore posed due
process
138ld. concerns).

Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264 (5 th Cir. 1982) (holding that no right to
appointment of counsel exists in a civil case unless the case presents exceptional
circumstances).
Although "no comprehensive definition of exceptional
circumstances is practical," Id., there are factors that should be considered in
ruling on requests for appointment of counsel, including (1) the type and
complexity of the case; (2) whether the indigent is capable of adequately
presenting his case; (3) whether the indigent is in a position to adequately
139
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require a more stringent finding of "exceptional circumstances" to
appoint counsel under 19 15.141 These courts state that appointment
of counsel in civil cases is a privilege, and not a constitutional right
and is justified only in exceptional circumstances where a court
finds the case presents complex factual and42 legal issues and the
litigant cannot adequately represent himself.1
The common threads running throughout all of the standards
discussed above that are used to determine whether counsel should
be assigned to preserve "fundamental fairness" is the complexity
of the case and the ability of the litigant to get the relvant facts
before the court. 143 Victims of domestic violence proceeding in
the IDVC should fall well within any of these tests. It is well
documented that the dynamics of domestic violence adds
complexity to even an otherwise simple case. 144 Additionally,
given the power imbalance inherent in the context of domestic
violence it is highly unlikely that victims will get the relevant facts
before the court and likewise, will not have the resources to obtain
expert witnesses on their behalf.

investigate his case; (4) whether the evidence will consist in large part of
conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in
cross examination. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 ( 5th Cir. 1982).
140 Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1ith
Cir. 1987) (holding that
appointment of counsel in a civil case is required to preserve due process only in
exceptional cases, such as where the facts and legal issue are so novel or
complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner) (1 1 1h Cir. 1987)
141 See, e.g., Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1980); Weller v.
Dickinson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601,
605-606 (6th Cir. 1993).
142 Lavadon v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 60, 605-6
(6th Cir. 1993)
143 The fact that many litigants are compromised in their ability
to get relevant
facts before the court was recognized in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1961) where
the Supreme Court found the constitutional guarantee of due process required
that juveniles charged as delinquents have the right to counsel. "Failure to
observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances,
which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or
inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." Id. at 5.
144 Besty Tai, Note, The Trend Towards Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FoRDHAM L.REv. 1285, 1293-94
(MARCH 2000).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A PREDOMINANTLY CRIMINAL MODEL
FOR THE IDVC: WHEN THE IDVC VICTIM'S RIGHT To COUNSEL
SHOULD ATTACH

The batterer is not the only adversary the victim of
domestic violence might encounter in the IDVC. At the outset of
any IDVC proceeding, a domestic violence victim may find herself
in an adversarial position to the state and may be subject to various
types of questioning where the State exerts "overwhelming" or
''coercive influences".
The challenge of victim autonomy has played an enormous
role in recent developments of criminal law and enforcement
protocols regarding domestic violence. The unwillingness of many
victims to participate in the prosecution of their abusers' criminal
cases has long been considered a critical obstruction to offender
accountability. Reformers have theorized that in these cases the
abuser has so restricted his victim's autonomy that respecting her
decision about the prosecution of a case only presents
opportunities for the abuser to dictate his wishes through the
victim. 145 This view has provided moral authority for new criminal
law enforcement protocols mandating state action that bypasses
altogether the articulated will of the domestic violence victim, e.g.,
mandatory arrest and "no-drop" prosecution laws. Under such
assumptions, the "benefits of mandatory arrest [in reducing the
social costs of domestic violence] outweigh victim autonomy.' 46
While such statistics indicate that these initiatives have
increased conviction rates, 147 legal theorists disagree as to the
benefit, if any, to victims of domestic violence. Many have
welcomed mandatory state interventions because they represent a
salutary shift from social norms that held the victim responsible for
provoking and/or enduring the domestic violence to an aggressive
focus on offender accountability. Others contend that these state
actions "re-victimize" the victim by replicating the batterer's
modus operandi of subjugating the victim's autonomy to a stronger
145Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The
Need for MandatoryArrest in California,85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 687 (May 1997).

146
Id.at 686; Hanna, supra note 21 at 1888.
147"[W]omen who have been sanctioned for failure to cooperate [with

mandatory protocols] may be treated poorly on other legal proceedings such as
divorce and custody. " Hanna, supranote 14 at 1898.
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power. 148 A victim unwilling to cooperate with a therapeutic
process and goal backed by a court whose jurisdiction over
virtually every part of her life comes with a problem-solving
mandate may find herself in a singularly difficult position.149 As
the focus of this court shifts to helping this victim, she may find
herself the object of its blame. Furthermore, bypassing a victim's
assessment of her own needs, safety and otherwise, can be
lethal. 5 0
A victim who is unwilling to testify or to cooperate with
the prosecutor may face neglect charges if it is perceived that she is
not taking the necessary measures to protect her children from the
exposure to domestic violence. Once a neglect proceeding is filed
the victim may be subjected to "moral and psychological pressures
to confess emanating from sources of official coercion, of which
the right to counsel was meant to protect. 151 Alternatively, the
victim of domestic violence may herself be a respondent in a crosspetition filed by her batterer.
Social service providers with the
ear of the judge may deem her incapacitated under a clinical
discipline that views the victim as a patient in need of treatment
rather than as a litigant whose right to be heard must be
guaranteed. Legal advocates under the employ of the court may
similarly censure her, or at least feel obligated to pressure her into
compliance "for her own good."
Shielding unrepresented
individuals from imbalances of power and coercive governmental
pressure is the fundamental underlying purpose of the Sixth
Amendment.
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainright,152 holding that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments require the states to provide counsel
to criminal defendants charged with felony offenses. The Court
extended this right to all criminal cases

in Argersinger v.

148

Mills, infra note 170

149

Epstein, supra note 5 at 38; regarding the risk involved in a "service-defined

(as opposed to woman centered) advocacy, where advocates focus on providing
available services regardless of whether they fit into a particular women's risk
analysis or safety plan."
15oId.at 18.

11Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1961).

152
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Hamlin.153 The Court further held that the right "does not attach
until formal judiciary proceedings are initiated against an
individual by way of indictment, information, arraignment, or
preliminary hearing,"'' 54 because it is at this point that the
government has committed itself to prosecute and the adversarial
of the government and defendant have solidified.' 55 It is at this
point that the power imbalance between the government and the
defendant are perceived to be unconstitutional and a deprivation of
the defendant's right to a fair trial unless counsel is available to
represent the defendant and negate any overwhelming or coercive
influences that might proceed from the government's prosecution.
It is widely recognized that the driving force in domestic
violence is the power and control of the batterer over his victim.
This power and control may be physical or perceived by the
victim. Given this power imbalance the victim of domestic
violence is similarly positioned as a criminal defendant facing
coercive forces inherent in the government prosecution of the
criminal case. She must face her perpetrator in any negotiation or
adversarial proceeding and is at a distinct disadvantage and subject
to overwhelming and coercive influences if not represented by
counsel. This power imbalance only increases if the perpetrator
has assigned counsel in the criminal case that is proceeding in the
IDVC and the victim is present and is unrepresented for collateral
proceedings. Following Gideon and its progeny, this right to
counsel should attach at the first court appearance in the integrated
court because it is at this point that the power imbalance between
the perpetrator, the government and the victim of domestic
violence solidifies and the victim becomes vulnerable to
potentially coercive forces that may have a chilling effect on her
constitutional due process rights to preserve her personal autonomy
and to have her voice be heard in the proceedings.
Often, victims will obtain ex parte relief only to drop the
case or drop important safety provisions once they face their
abuser in court. Unrepresented victims may also drop their orders
of protection as part of negotiating a consent agreement for
custody and visitation. It is critical for victims to have counsel as
153Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
154

United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 185 (1984).

155

McNeil v. Washington, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
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early as preliminary proceedings because individual safety
concerns may be negotiated away in the initial court appearances.
It is interesting - if not telling- that there is little or no
mention of the role of a victim's attorney in much of the current
writings about the IDVCs. 156 This may be in large part attributable
to the lack of trained domestic violence attorneys in many areas of
the country where pilot IDVCs are located. There is, however,
significant discussion of "legal advocates" and other lay personnel
who help "navigate" the victim through the alien complexities of
the legal system.
This type of quasi-legal assistance can include legal advice,
help completing legal documents and "court accompaniment."
These advocates seem to be either employees of the court itself or
employees of domestic violence services agencies contracted by
the IDVC to advise victims appearing before it.157 The impression
is inescapable that in the ranking of services to increase victim
cooperation with the legal process, attorney representation for
victims is not a priority.
The striking absence of enhanced legal representation for
victims in the IDVC suggests that in integrating the victim's civil
legal actions into a template of criminal jurisprudence, the victim
may be viewed as a witness only and the criminal case may take
precedence over the collateral civil matters. It is therefore crucial
that all IDVCs be studied for the impact of a predominantly
criminal court approach upon the victim's civil cases and, by
extension, the victim's constitutional rights.
Because the batterer is facing criminal proceedings in the
IDVC he is automatically afforded the right to assigned counsel.
The victim may find herself at odds with the prosecutor as well as
her batterer once proceedings are initiated in the IDVC. A victim
could well give up important rights (restitution) and or forgo safety
concerns (drop vacate or stay away provisions in OOP) unless
afforded the right to consult with counsel at the commencement of
the IDVC proceeding.
Jennifer Thompson, Who's Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing
a Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court
Programs, 56 ME. L. REv. 407 (2004); See generally, Betsy Tsai, supra note 6
for an overview of many of the pilot programs around the country.
156

157 id.
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V.

ETHICS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE:
THE
CHALLENGE OF VICTIM AUTONOMY AND PRESERVING DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS

The American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility relating to a lawyer's duty to promote
her client's cause states in Rule 1.3 that, "A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
This imperative is elucidated in the accompanying Comment: "[..
* A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf." This expansive language has spawned an entire spectrum
of models for advocacy. These range from the "lawyer as hired
gun" proponents who advocate a laser-like crusade for the client's
ends, to those who hold that the attorney's duties are first and
foremost to the cause of justice. 5 8 This spectrum can also be
understood in the following terms: how far may an attorney
ethically stray from promoting the articulated wishes of her client?
The predominant approach 1 59 views the attorney as the
voice of the client's informed decision. In this model, the attorney
informs the client of the available options and the client then
articulates a decision concerning the goal she wishes to pursue in
the legal action. As long as the goal does not promote criminal
activity [sic] the attorney is obligated to advocate for and promote
the client's chosen course with all possible zeal. Under our
adversary system, a neutral adjudicator arrives at a true and just
decision when judging between two zealous advocates presenting
their clients' cases in the most favorable light possible.
In essence the predominant approach articulates the duty of
the attorney to "preserve and foster the client's autonomy within
the law."' 0 This implies that strictly and squarely within the
bounds of the law at all times, an attorney must promote the stated
158

Robin West, Symposium, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less than

Ideal World, 51 STAN. L. REv. 973 (April 1999).
159 Those who oppose this approach hold that an attorney's ethical duties are
first and foremost to the integrity of the legal system and the duty to the client's
wishes is secondary. According to this view, an attorney should examine their
client's goals in the broader context of the outcome of the dispute that the
attorney decides is the most "just." Attorneys can then refuse to advocate for
certain goals that deviate unacceptably form this outcome. Id.
160
MONROE H. FREEDMAN "Understanding Lawyers' Ethics" (1990).
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goals of their client. Such representation is not only the best
means to protect the client's due process rights but also serves as
"best practice" so as to comply withy ethical mandates.
Concomitantly, representation that preserves and fosters the
client's autonomy strengthens the public's acceptance of the legal
system's authority, since "client control of the case is a significant
element in a litigant's perception that justice has been done,
regardless of the outcome."' 61 Most importantly, however, in the
context of the IDVC this approach will ensure that the victim's due
process rights are protected by having counsel to voice the stated
goals and wishes of the victim, thus ensuring that the victim is not
merely present in the proceedings but also has meaningful access
to the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
Even using this victim-focused approach as the correct
ethical guide, the attorney for the victim of domestic violence in
the IDVC may confront difficult ethical quandaries beyond those
involved in other kinds of legal representation, even under the
traditional adversarial judicial system. Unique pressures may
operate in integrated courts that frustrate the attorney in promoting
the client's expressed goals. These pressures fall into two general
categories: (1) How does the attorney determine when the victim
of domestic violence is articulating her free and informed will?
and, (2) Does the victim's attorney represent the "cause" or the
client? And what should the attorney do when the client has clearly
chosen a dangerous path?
The Challenge of Victim Autonomy
Kristen has a custody case in the IDVC in addition to the
criminal case against her husband. Kristen was physically and
psychologically abusedfor many years by her husband and has
recently started therapy, which seems to have empowered her to
separate from her abuser and seek custody of their child. In
between court appearances Kristen makes an appointment to see
her attorney and asks to withdraw her case. She states that her
abuser has promised her a large sum of money from an unknown
source ifshe withdraws her criminal court case. He has also told
her that ifshe doesn 't withdraw her case, as soon as the case is
"6'Id. at 55.
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resolved he would disappear without a trace andforever from her
life and her children's lives. The attorney knows from Kristen's
history that her abuser usually makes good on his threats.
How should the attorney try to 'foster and preserve
Kristen 's autonomy within the law, how should the attorney direct
Kristen 's case?
Scholars have noted many privations that can compromise
a client's ability to arrive at a free and informed decision about the
course of their legal action. Poverty, racism and a lack of education
can impact a client's free will.' 62 The crime of domestic violence

inflicts perhaps the ultimate impairment on the victim's autonomy.
The perpetrator of domestic violence tries to exert control over all
aspects of the victim's existence, mental, emotional and
physical. 163 In the context of the court proceedings, perpetrators of
domestic violence may use their control over their victims'
decision- making and autonomy to manipulate negotiations so as to
escape accountability for their abuse.' 6 4 By depriving the victim of
power over her own destiny, the abuser "obliterate[s] the victim's
ability to make reasonable choices,"' 165 i.e., choices representing
the victim's best interests. A successful perpetrator thereby
"produces" a victim unwilling and/or unable to support the legal
system's efforts to hold the abuser accountable for his crimes.
This seemingly inescapable dialectic about the nature of
victim autonomy presents difficult ethical quandaries for the
victim's attorney. When the victim chooses a course of legal
action that appears overwhelmingly to promote the perpetrator's
abusive ends over her own welfare, her attorney may have
justifiable concerns about the outcome of successfully advocating
for this course in court. The lawyer's understanding of the
dynamics of domestic violence may lead her to question exactly
whose interests their client is promoting. In such situations how
162
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164Rita Smith & Paul Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 No. 4
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does the attorney "know" what the victim truly wants? In such
situations, how does the victim's attorney discern, let alone
"preserve and foster," their client's autonomy?
All clients, even those seemingly uncompromised and
independent can simultaneously embrace contradictory objectives.
Wrongfully discharged, "bullied" and discriminated against
employees often want their jobs restored rather than substantial
compensation. Victims of toxic torts with potentially huge and
provable claims often accept significantly smaller settlements
rather than endure protracted litigation.
Domestic violence
victims, often and understandably frequently want both to be safe,
free, and unafraid, and to live with the partner they love or the
partner they feel is needed to provide financial security for
themselves and their children.
Attorneys representing clients in the IDVC should
recognize the potential for and avoid the impulse of "misplaced
paternalism" and have on-going consultations with the victim of
domestic violence to define client goals and objectives. These
discussions should also include safety planning' 6 and referrals to
the support services available through the IDVC.
Agenda vs Client Focused Representation
Isabel and her boyfriend, who is her child's father, are
present in the IDVC with their attorneys as petitioner and
respondent respectively in a case for an order ofprotection. After
her boyfriend's last attack on her, Isabel fled to a shelter where
she was connected with her attorney, who works in the shelter's
legal division. Unbeknownst to her attorney, Isabel has been
reconsidering her request for a full, i.e., stay away order of
protection, and has decided to move back in with her boyfriend.
She still wants a limited order of protection that will prohibit her
boyfriend from intimidating, threatening or committing any
criminaloffense against her. Isabel has refrainedfrom telling her
attorney about her change of heart because she is afraid of her
attorney's disapproval.In her experience at the sheltershe noticed
that everyone who works there strongly promotes the shelter's
66
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mission statement: to "provide a safe haven for victims and their
children away from their abusers, and empower victims to break
the cycle of violence by leading independent lives."
A conference is held with the judge's law clerk before the
trial, during which the clerk urges the parties to reach an
agreement about the contents of an order of protection to which
the respondent can consent, and thereby avoid a trial. Isabel
states that she wants a limited order of protection. Surprised and
taken aback, her attorney states that given the facts of this case,
she cannot and will not representIsabel ifshe is seeking anything
less than a full order ofprotection.
The interests of the cause of eradicating domestic violence
can militate against the victim's attorney promoting and fostering
her client's expressed goals. When the victim's articulated goals
appear to be in conflict with the cause of eradicating domestic
violence, her attorney can feel beleaguered by the sense that by
promoting her client's wishes she would be promoting domestic
violence. Attorneys working in the legal division of a not-forprofit organization whose mission statement includes language
about promoting the victim's safety by enabling her to separate
from her abuser may find that the "cause" motivates them
personally and professionally more than the client. Attorneys
whose work is funded under grants advocating specific "solutions"
or "desired outcomes" for domestic violence, such as arresting and
obtaining stay away orders of protection against abusers, may feel
as ethically bound to advocate for the directives of the funding
entity as for their client's stated goals. 16 7 Similarly attorneys
working for shelters may feel compelled or pressured to follow the
shelter's agenda rather than the client's directives.
Considerations in Establishing Ethical Guidelines for the Victim's
Attorney in the IDVC
An attorney who diligently and zealously promotes her
client's decisions within the law will reassure the victim of the
integrity and impartiality, and hence the legitimacy, of the legal
167 See

generally Shalleck, supra note 165 (for discussion of inherent tensions

raised for "client-centered" lawyering due to attorney's personal values, past
experience and attitudes).

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XIII

system."' 168 This kind of representation is most critical for
domestic violence victims because it is central to victim safety.
With statistics reflecting that only 20% of domestic violence
incidents are ever reported at all, 169 the potential of all court
170
reforms to alienate victims must be considered carefully.
Representation by an attorney with clear ethical obligations to
preserve and foster the victim's autonomy not only is critical to
protect the victim's procedural due process rights but also is
critical to the victim's sense of empowerment and control over her
legal actions. Victims who are not afforded this sense of control
may be dissuaded from accessing the legal system to remedy future
abuse. It is therefore important to establish clear ethical guidelines
for attorneys representing victims of domestic violence in the
IDVC. Ethical rules should establish a duty for victims' attorneys
to foster and preserve the victim's autonomy by respecting her
client's particular assessment of her situation and the risks or
benefits inherent in any single legal course. 171 Comments to these
rules should squarely address the challenges inherent in discerning
victim autonomy, and in agenda vs. client driven representation
that were presented above. This will help attorneys recognize
situations in which they are tempted to impose their own goals on
their client out of a sense of "misplaced paternalism,",172 with
potentially lethal results. Concomitantly, comments to ethical
rules should also give attorneys guidance when faced with a
situation where a client insists on following a clearly dangerous
path. Clearly safety planning and referrals to support services may
not suffice in these instances but rather a more pro-active approach
by the attorney may be indicated. But where is the line drawn that
Since, as stated above, "client control of the case is a significant element in a
litigant's perception that justice has been done, regardless of the outcome,"
Freedman, supra note 158 at 55.
169 Anne O'Dell
170 The personal experience of the authors in representing hundreds of domestic
violence victims in Family Court confirms how easily a victim can be driven
underground by the fear that the legal system will be unresponsive to her wishes,
particularly when she advocates more lenient measures regarding her abuser
than that recommended by the court advocates and support staff.
71 Mills, Linda G., "Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of
State Intervention," 113 HARv. L. REv. 550, 569 (Dec. 1999).
172 Freedman, supra note 158 at 57.
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separates misplaced paternalism from pro-active advice and legal
counseling?
Ann Shalleck has delineated certain special considerations
in the representation of domestic violence victims 73 that should be
used as important guideposts in developing these ethical rules. For
example, the attorney should accept a priori the process in which
her client is engaged, and support her client's decisions as they
The legal
evolve through the course of the representation.
representation should respond to the possible shifts in course that
often result from a victim's developing response to the
complexities of the abuse as well as her different legal and
personal options. "[T]he lawyer needs to see his or her role not as
furthering a stable goal of the client, but as creating an opportunity
for a client to explore multiple possibilities, as well as her own
changing desires to further any of them."'' 74 This will enable the
victim to "figure out, within the contours of that relationship, what
she thinks is best for her to do."' 175 However, representing the
client in this manner may jeopardize the attorney's integrity as
viewed by the court who may perceive the attorney as "waffling"
rather than as advocating for the client at every step of the evolving
process. The attorney may have to educate the court as to the ongoing processes the victim encounters in order to clarify and
For example, a victim
substantiate the victim's changing needs.
a
contemplating divorce may need to delete no contact provision
from an existing order of protection so as to be able to discuss
Other victims may initially pursue a
certain property issues.
provision
only to return at the next court date
vacate or stay away
fearing that they will not be able to pay the upcoming rent
demanding that their order be modified so that the abuser be
permitted to return to the home. Still others besieged by guilt
when their children express that they miss their father return to
court wanting to withdraw the entire matter.
Adequate legal representation for domestic violence
victims may also require more time than is usual with clients to
accommodate the particular complexities of the victim's situation.
This is a particularly challenging aspect of diligent representation
173
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for domestic violence victims, but ethically necessary,
nonetheless. 176 The ABA model rules for legal representation of
domestic violence victims refer to the need for attorneys to possess
the "skills required" for such representation. 177 This may well
178
include representation that is available at 2 a.m., for example.
Furthermore, if the IDVC intends to devote itself to victim safety,
might it not be ethically obligated to provide legal resources on a
24 hour basis? With statistics reflecting an almost 75% increase in
victims accessing final protection orders after receiving 24/7 legal
assistance,1 79 should there be IDVC attorneys available on call and
available on an around the clock basis to offer legal information
and services to victims at the time when victims are asking for
assistance and are most likely to be receptive to such assistance?
[reality of court intervention coming weeks after incident neighborhood courts like in Time Square that are 24/7 and Ds are
processed immediately and referred to services within hours after
arrest]
Proponents of the IDVC have accurately understood that
for the court to achieve its goals, "victims should have more input
into the proceedings. ' 8 Increased social services to victims can
indeed serve as a means of "amplifying victims' voices [to] help
the government better respond to individual concerns."' 18 But care
176

Shalleck, supra note 165 at 1033.

See Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.1 (2002); John M. Burman, Lawyers
and Domestic Violence: Raising the Standard of Practice,9 Mich J. Gender &
L. 207, 224 (2003).
178 The author's experience as 24/7 on-call attorney for Project DETER, in
speaking with victims in the moments after an incident of abuse and
representing her from that moment onward has proven repeatedly the enormous
impact of such representation on the victim's ability to maintain their actions in
civil court. Statistics compiled during the implementation of DETER indicate
that while prior to DETER only 27% of victims seeking temporary orders of
protection in civil court actually returned to court to obtain a final order of
protection, 95% of those assisted by a Project DETER attorney did so.
Furthermore, an attorney speaking with a victim virtually at the time of the
incident has an appreciation for the nature of the abuse and its effects that is
impossible to receive at any other time, and that attorney's ability to advocate
for her client is immeasurably enhanced by this understanding.
179 Project DETER, described in "A Handbook of Intervention Strategies
with
Domestic Violence," by Albert R. Roberts, Oxford University Press (2002).
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should be taken that the victim's voice as "victim" is not amplified
without an equal amplification of the victim's voice as an
empowered party before the court.
The victim's attorney,
operating under appropriate ethical guidelines, plays a key role in
maintaining this balance.
To empower the victim (and thereby hold realistic promise
for diminishing domestic violence) court reformers must proceed
cautiously with a course that protects the freedom of the victim's
choice in a manner that will be clearly understood as such by the
victim from her initial contact with the judicial system. The
victim's civil attorney is the only appropriate guardian of these
rights, and her role and ethical obligations should be both
expanded and articulated accordingly. In addition to critical social
and community services support, the victim must view the legal
system as just, and that can only be if she is given an opportunity
to be heard as she decides - freely and without coercion. It has
wisely been noted that, "[t]he interaction between lawyer and
client is a part of construction what it means
' 82for a woman who has
system."'
legal
the
with
deal
to
abused
been
CONCLUSION

Due process demands representation for domestic violence
victims in integrated courts. The more the IDVC court takes on
the role of social engineer and neutral dispenser of justice, the
more crucial it is that the victims of domestic violence have expert,
professional legal representation to protect their right to refuse to
be "socially engineered." Only an attorney fully versed in the
dynamics of domestic violence, and dedicated to, protecting the
victim's due process rights and personal autonomy can protect the
victim from the kind of state action in which every aspect of her
most personal existence is considered within the court's holistic
jurisdiction. 183 Only an attorney fully aware and dedicated to the
IDVC's victim's due process rights can protect the victim from the
kind of state action that my ultimately interfere with the victim's
182 Shalleck,

supra note 165 at 1047.

In the context of criminal defense, but also directly applicable to this thesis,
"A central element of human dignity is personal autonomy, particularly in
matters that affect our own lives as substantially as those in which lawyers are
needed for assistance." Freedman, supra note 158 at 54.
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liberty interests. Under these circumstances, the victim's right to
counsel should logically attach at the outset of any IDVC
proceeding, even if initially only a criminal case against the abuser
is contemplated since case management that flows out of the
criminal case may ultimately impact the victim as well as the
abuser. 8
Threats to a domestic violence victim's constitutional rights
increase exponentially when she is involved in an IDVC
proceeding due to her exposure to coercive forces of the
government as well as her batterer. Even well-meaning therapeutic
jurisprudence and the cadre of professionals may not always have
an identity of interest with the victim and the IDVC advocates
have no responsibility of confidentiality that exist in a attorneyclient relationship..
IDVCs have been created for the noble purpose of
improving the judicial response to domestic violence. Victim
safety and empowerment will only be realized if the IDVCs
provide a protected space, a sanctuary, where victims can speak
their truth. To provide victims with meaningful access to the
IDVC and to ensure that their voices will be heard and to prevent
due process tragedies, the legislatures when creating the IDVCs
should guarantee the right to counsel to victims at the outset of
their IDVC proceedings, even if initially, only a criminal case
against the abuser is contemplated.

184

Martin, supra note 63 at 331-33.

